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Sexual Stereotyping in 
Partnership Decisions: 
The Second Stage
Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse
Reaches the Supreme Court
By Martha S. Weisel
Introduction
At first glance, gender bias and the professional 
woman in accounting seems to be a contradiction 
in terminology. Although there is a long history of 
womendiscrimination against the 
“pioneers” entering the 
profession [Ried, Acken 
and Jancura, 1987, p. 
339], the barriers to 
entry have eroded. 
In the last fifteen 
years, women have 
entered into the 
accounting profession 
at an unprecedented 
rate. More than 50% 
of the women who are 
CPAs have received 
their professional 
accreditation since 1980 
[Stillablower, 1985, p. 
22]. Today 50% of the 
new accountants being 
hired are women 
[Heaney, 1988, p. 8]. 
Women accountants 
are no longer seen 
as a rarity, and major accounting firms routinely 
hire women into entry level positions where the 
entry level salaries equal those of their male co­
workers [Olson and Frieze, 1986, p. 28].






for women in 
accounting. 
Women repre 
sented 3% of the 
partners in the 
Big 8 public 
accounting firms 
in 1986, as com 
pared to 1% in 
1983, a small 
increase in light of 
the growth in the 
number of women 
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In 1984, the United States 
Supreme Court made its first 
decision relating to partnership 
decision-making. In Hishon v. King 
and Spaulding, [104 S.Ct. 2229, 
1984], the highest court determined 
that professional partnerships fall 
under Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 and that partnership 
decisions should be evaluated under 
the employment discrimination 
law; that is, partnerships may not 
discriminate on the basis of sex in 
choosing partners.
The purpose of this article is to 
examine the court’s most recent 
decision involving professional 
partnerships, Hopkins v. Price 
Waterhouse, [57 U.S.L.W. 4469, 
1989]. It is a case involving 
important issues relating to gender 
bias, stereotyping on the basis of 
gender, and a professional woman’s 
access into the upper ranks. 
Hopkins is the first case dealing 
with the methodology used by a 
partnership in making partnership 
decisions. The article has several 
objectives including (1) the 
development of the factual 
background of Hopkins v. Price 
Waterhouse and an explanation of 
the decisions of the lower courts; (2) 
an analysis of the decision of the 
United States Supreme Court; and 
(3) an examination of the meaning 
of the decision to the profession in 
general and in particular to women 
accountants who are on a 
partnership track.
... gender bias and 
the professional 
woman in accounting 
seems to be a 
contradiction in 
terminology.
Martha S. Weisel is an assistant 
professor of Business Law at Hofstra 
University, School of Business, 
Hempstead, New York. She is admitted 
to practice in the courts of the State of 
New York and in the federal courts for 
the Eastern and Southern Districts.
Background
Ann Hopkins was a senior 
manager at Price Waterhouse, a 
Big 8 accounting firm. At the time 
that she was proposed for 
partnership, she had worked at the 
firm’s Office of Government 
Services [OGS] in Washington, 
D.C., for five years. She became a 
candidate for partnership when the 
partners in her local office 
submitted her name as a candidate. 
Of the 88 people suggested for 
partnership status in 1982, Hopkins 
was the only woman considered 
[825 F.2d at 462].
After being nominated by her 
division, Price Waterhouse 
circulated her name together with 
an appraisal from OGS to all 
partners. Partners submitted 
detailed evaluations of the 
candidate if they were familiar 
with Ms. Hopkins, while those who 
did not know her well submitted 
brief evaluations. The evaluations 
indicated that Hopkins had a 
number of strengths and 
weaknesses. Clients appeared 
pleased with Hopkins’ professional 
performance. Staff members 
indicated that “she was generally 
viewed as a highly competent 
project leader who worked long 
hours, pushed vigorously to meet 
deadlines and demanded much 
from the multidisciplinary staffs 
with which she worked” [618 F.2d 
at 1112]. However, her 
relationships with staff members 
were troublesome, with both 
supporters and detractors noting 
“she was sometimes overly 
aggressive, unduly harsh, difficult 
to work with and impatient with 
staff” [618 F.2d at 1113].
Many of the negative comments 
concerning Hopkins had a sexual 
overtone. Critics suggested that she 
needed a “course in charm school” 
[825 F.2d at 463]. Even her 
supporters reacted negatively to 
Ann Hopkins’ personality because 
of her gender, noting that “she may 
have overcompensated for being a 
woman” and that her use of 
profanity, though no worse than 
many of the men, was offensive 
“because she is a lady using foul 
language” [825 F.2d at 463].
The concerns of the Price 
Waterhouse partners led to the 
candidacy of Hopkins, along with 
that of 19 male candidates, being 
put on hold. Hopkins’ major 
supporter, after the initial decision 
to hold her back one year, advised 
her “to walk more femininely, talk 
more femininely, dress more 
femininely, wear make-up, have 
her hair styled and wear jewelry” 
[618 F.2d 1117]. All of the men put 
on hold were renominated the 
following year and 15 of the 19 
became partners [825 F.2d 462]. 
Hopkins’ division did not 
renominate her. At that point, 
knowing that it was highly unlikely 
that she would become a partner, 
Hopkins resigned. Before 
resigning, she discussed the matter 
with one of the firm’s partners who 
agreed with her decision.
The Lower Courts
Ann Hopkins brought her case to 
federal district court, arguing that
Hopkins is the first 
case dealing with the 
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Price Waterhouse had 
discriminated against her on the 
basis of her sex. She argued that 
she was qualified to be a partner, 
that she was not selected, and that 
Price Waterhouse continued to seek 
partners with her qualifications 
[618 F.2d 1113]. Under Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a 
plaintiff who meets these criteria 
establishes a prima facie case of 
employment discrimination on the 
basis of sex. Once that is 
established, it is up to the 
defendant to establish that the 
firm’s decision regarding the 
plaintiff was not based on 
impermissible sexual factors.
Price Waterhouse maintained 
that it was Hopkins’ interpersonal 
skills, not gender discrimination, 
which negated her partnership 
chances. The district court noted 
that questions relating to 
interpersonal skills were a 
legitimate concern and that 
Hopkins’ style “provided ample 
justification for the complaints that 
formed the basis of the Policy 
Board’s decision (to put her on 
hold),” [618 F.Supp. at 1114]. 
Further, the decision by her office
Partnership status 
has been particularly 
elusive for women in 
accounting.
not to renominate her was, 
according to the district court, 
related to concerns about her 
interpersonal skills rather than any 
sexual discrimination [618 F.Supp. 
at 1114].
However, the district court 
distinguished between Hopkins’ 
interpersonal skills and the sexual 




The court noted that other women 
had been evaluated using sex-based 
criteria, in that “[candidates were 
viewed favorably if partners 
believed they maintained their 
femininity while becoming 
effective professional managers”; 
but “[t]o be identified as a women’s 
libber was regarded as a negative 
comment” [618 F.Supp. at 1117]. 
The evidence indicated that Price 
Waterhouse gave a great deal of 
weight to the negative comments 
although “those comments reflected 
unconscious sexual stereotyping by 
male evaluators based on outmoded 
attitudes towards women” [825 
F.Supp. 1118-9].
The district court which heard 
the testimony determined that 
these comments were part and 
parcel of the regular partnership 
evaluation, that the firm did not 
discourage such comments, did not 
address the need to revise such 
thinking, and in fact did not take 
any action at all [825 F.Supp. at 
1119].
The district court acknowledged 
that such thinking could not be 
quantified. However, it found that 
although her interpersonal skills 
were a legitimate subject of 
concern, any analysis of her 
interpersonal skills was tainted by 
Price Waterhouse’s failure to deal 
with sexism in its evaluation 
scheme.
The lower court’s decision 
highlights the two key issues 
presented in Hopkins that were 
eventually decided by the United 
States Supreme Court. The 
evaluation process was deemed to 
be tainted and this produced what 
is called a “mixed motive” issue. In 
a mixed motive case, the employer 
uses legitimate business concerns 
in making an employment decision. 
However, those legitimate concerns 
are combined with the use of 
impermissible sexual 
discrimination. According to the 
district court, in Hopkins there was 
the impermissible sex stereotyping. 
However, there was also the 
legitimate business concerns 
concerning Hopkins’ lack of 
interpersonal skills. In such a 
scenario, where the plaintiff 
(Hopkins) has established that 
impermissible factors (sexual 
stereotyping) played a significant
Clients appeared 
pleased with Hopkins' 
professional 
performance.
role in denying her a partnership 
position, the burden shifts to the 
defendant (Price Waterhouse) to 
establish that the decision would 
have been the same anyway.
For Price Waterhouse to meet its 
burden, the district court required 
that the accounting partnership 
prove that its decision would have 
been the same through clear and 
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convincing evidence. It should be 
noted that the District Court had 
determined that Hopkins had 
already completed the initial prima 
facie case, that is, that she was 
qualified for the position, that she 
was not chosen for the position, and 
that Price Waterhouse continued to 
look for other partners. At this 
juncture, the burden switches to 
the defendant.
The normal burden of proof 
required for civil cases is 
preponderence of evidence, 
meaning that the defendant 
convinces the trier of facts that the 
defendant’s position is more 
believable or more likely to have 
occurred. The District Court 
determined that Price Waterhouse 
had not met this requirement, and 
found in favor of Hopkins.
The Circuit Court of Appeals 
affirmed the lower court’s decision 
to shift the burden from Hopkins to 
Price Waterhouse once Hopkins 
had established her prima facie 
case because the facts of Hopkins 
involved mixed motives, one that 
included Hopkins’ “apparent lack 
of interpersonal skills” as well as 
the “sexually biased evaluations” 
[825 F.2d at 471]. The appellate 
court agreed that Price Waterhouse 
would have to prove that its 
decision was not based on the 
impermissibly biased evaluations 
by clear and convincing evidence, 
a burden that Price Waterhouse 
did not meet.
United States Supreme 
Court Looks At Sexual 
Stereotyping and 
Burden off Proof
On May 1, 1989, the 
United States Supreme 
Court handed down its
decision in Hopkins [57 USLW 
4469]. The justices looked at three primary 
issues including, (1) what is sexual stereotyping 
and whether it is legally relevant, (2) the type
of evidence that must be offered 
by an employer in a mixed 
motive case once an employee has 
established sexual stereotyping, 
and (3) level of proof required of an 
employer in a mixed motive 
employment discrimination case.
A threshold issue in Hopkins was
whether sexual stereotyping is in 
fact discrimination in employment 
decisions. Although Price 
Waterhouse did not specifically 
argue this point, the court noted 
that by putting the phrase in 
quotation marks “throughout its 
brief seems to us [the Court] an 
insinuation that either such 
stereotyping was not present in this 
case of that it lacks legal relevance” 
[57 USLW at 4475]. The Court 
rejected both hypotheses, finding 
that forbidding an employer from 
stereotyping an individual based on 
her gender is just what Congress 
had in mind in passing Title VIL 
“An employer who objects to 
aggresiveness in women but whose
this trait places 
intolerable and 
Catch 22: out 
they behave 
and out of a 
positions require 
women in an 
impermissible 
of a job if 
aggressively
job if they don’t. Title VII lifts 
women out of this bind” [57 USLW 
at 4476]. An employer who acts on 
the basis of a belief that a woman 
cannot be aggressive or that she 
must not be has impermissibly used 
sexual stereotypes in reaching an 
employment decision [57 USLW at
4475].
The court noted that it is not the 
remarks themselves which are 
considered sexual stereotyping but 
whether the remarks played a part 
in the employer’s decision [57 
USLW at 4476]. Sexual 
stereotyping must be a motivating 
factor used by the employer in 
making its decision. To determine 
this, the Supreme Court suggested 
that a question be asked. “If we 
asked the employer at the moment 
of the decision what its reasons 
were and if we received a truthful 
response, one of those reasons 
would be that the applicant or 
employee was a woman” [57 USLW 
at 4475].
In Hopkins, the partners’ 
statements went beyond mere 
remarks. The evidence presented 
indicated that the partnership 
process required partners to make 
written comments on candidates, 
that a number of the comments 
made about Hopkins were based on 
sexual stereotypes and that the 
Policy Board’s decision was based 
on assessing these evaluations, 
many of which had sex-based 
overtones [Id. at 4476]. The court 
noted that it took “no special 
training to discern sex stereo - 
typing in a description of an 
aggressive female employee 
as requiring 'a course at 
charm school’ or in Hopkins’ 
major supporter’s advice, 
that she could correct her 
‘interpersonal skills’ through
makeup, clothing and jewelry” [57 USLW at 
4477].
Having concluded that sexual stereotyping 
is a form of gender-based discrimination that
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is legally relevant, the Supreme 
Court accepted the District Court’s 
conclusion that the comments of the 
Price Waterhouse partners in 
evaluating Hopkins showed just 
such impermissible stereotyping 
[Id. at 4475]. The fact that a 
number of the comments were 
made by supporters rather than 
opponents did not change the 
court’s decision.
The fact that Hopkins met that 
threshold requirement, showing a 
prima facie case of employment 
discrimination on the basis of sex, 
did not end the inquiry. The 
Supreme Court acknowledged that 
there were other factors present as 
well, namely Hopkins’ inadequate 
“interpersonal skills.” However, the 
interplay between impermissible 
sexual stereotyping and Hopkins’ 
poor interpersonal skills is just 
what makes this a mixed motive 
type employment discrimination 
case.
The Supreme Court began its 
analysis of Hopkins by going to the 
source, Title VII, stating that:
“[i]n passing Title VII, 
Congress made the simple but 
momentous announcement that 
sex, race, religion, and national 
origin are not relevant to the 
selection, evaluation, or 
compensation of employees.
Yet, the statute does not 
purport to limit the other 
qualities and characteristics 
that employers MAY take into 
account in making employment 
decisions,” [57 USLW at 4472].
Hopkins argued that Price 
Waterhouse’s decision not to make 
her a partner was based on her 
gender. She argued that once an 
employee establishes that her 
gender played a part in an 
employer’s decision, which she had 
done, the employer may not avoid 
liability under Title VII. In 
contrast, Price Waterhouse argued 
that an employer is liable under 
Title VII only if the employer’s 
decision “gives decisive 
consideration to an employee’s 
gender ... in making a decision 
that affects that employee” [Id. at 
4472]. Price Waterhouse argued 
that it is up to the employee to 
establish not just that gender 
figured into the employer’s 
decision-making process, but that 
the employer’s decision would have 
been different if gender had not 
been considered. The Supreme 
Court concluded that both sides’ 
views were somewhat distorted.
Price Waterhouse argued that 
Title VII meant that the plaintiff 
must establish that the 
partnership’s decision would have 
been different “but-for” the use of 
gender in making the decision. The 
Supreme Court disagreed, holding 
that “[t]he critical inquiry ... is 
whether gender was a factor in the 
employment decision AT THE 
MOMENT IT WAS MADE” [57 
USLW at 4473]. Further, the court 
noted that gender had only to be 
one factor that was considered by 
the partnership in making its 
decision, not that it had to be the 
only factor considered in making 
its decision.
The Supreme Court noted that 
“while an employer may not take 
gender into account in making an 
employment decision, ... it is free 
to decide against a woman for other 
reasons” [Id. at 4473]. Here, 
Hopkins established that the 
partnership decision-making 
process was tainted by the 
evaluations which used 
stereotypical concepts of women 
against her candidacy, an 
impermissible concern. However, 
the lower court also found that 
there were legitimate concerns 
about Hopkins’ inability to relate to 
lower-level employees.
Where an employer has mixed 
motives in making its decision, the 
Supreme Court concluded that the 
employer must carry the burden of 
justifying its ultimate decision [57 
USLW at 4475]. The court refused 
to require a woman who has 
established that gender played a 
role in an employment decision to 
also establish that the decision 
would have been different had 
gender not been considered. That is 
an obligation that falls on 
employers. The employee has the 
prima facie responsibility of 
establishing that gender was a 
motivating factor in making an 
employment decision, which 
Hopkins met. Having done so, the 
burden shifts to the employer to 
establish that the decision would 
have been the same even if gender 
had not been considered. The 
Supreme Court rejected Hopkins’ 
contention that once she established 
that sexual stereotyping was used 
in the partnership decision-making 
process, Price Waterhouse was 
liable under Title VII.
The Supreme Court rejected the 
lower court’s decision to require 
Price Waterhouse to prove that its 
decision would have been the same 
absent any gender-based 
evaluations by clear and convincing 
evidence. The highest court 
determined that such a 
requirement was not necessary in 
this type of employment 
discrimination case. Just what does 
Price Waterhouse have to establish 
to show that its decision not to 
make Hopkins a partner would be 
the same even if no gender-based 
information were used? The 
Supreme Court determined that 
the employer need only prove his 
position through a preponderance 
of evidence, the evidentiary 
standard which is normally used 
for civil cases. Therefore, the
(continued on page 9)
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Supreme Court remanded the case 
so that Price Waterhouse has the 
opportunity to prove by a 
preponderance of evidence that its 
decision would have been the same 
even if the tainted evaluations were 
not used.
Conclusion
In 1984, the United States 
Supreme Court brought 
partnership decision-making under 
the ambit of Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964. The highest 
court’s most recent decision, 
Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 
articulates some of the standards 
by which partnership decisions will 
be reviewed by a court. As such, 
the court’s opinion in Hopkins may 
be viewed as a primer for 
partnership candidates and their 
employers. It is a mixed decision. 
Women on partnership track can 
look to the court’s decision and see 
both positives and negatives. That 
is also true for the professional 
partnerships.
At the outset, women considering 
employment discrimination 
challenges because a partnership 
has failed to make them partners 
must be able to develop a strong 
prima facie case. This must include 
sufficient documentation that the 
woman was qualified for the 
position of partner, that she was not 
selected for partner, and that the 
partnership continued to look for 
other partners after her candidacy 
was denied. Ann Hopkins was able 
to develop that type of record. Her 
resume was very strong, both in 
recommendations from her 
colleagues in her division and from 
her clients, and in her ability to 
help generate business for the firm. 
This is a first step in any 
employment discrimination case 
involving a woman who believes 
that she was wrongfully denied a 
partnership position.
Once a woman has successfully 
met this initial hurdle that gender 
played a part in the employer’s 
decision not to make the woman a 
partner, the burden shifts to the 
employer. The Supreme Court’s 
decision in Hopkins makes it clear 
that although the employer may 
have decided not to make a woman 
a partner for reasons other than 
gender, and that such reasons are 
perfectly acceptable, once the 
woman establishes that gender 
played a role, the employer has the 
burden of showing that the decision 
was made for non-gender-based 
reasons. Therefore, in Hopkins, the 
burden is now on Price Waterhouse 
to establish through the testimony 
and other evidence that they
The Hopkins case sets 




present that their decision was 
based on Hopkins’ poor 
interpersonal skills and not on the 
sexual stereotyping that was 
revealed in the evaluations.
A most significant point is the 
court’s decision to require that the 
employer meet its burden only by a 
preponderance of evidence rather 
than through clear and convincing 
evidence, the burden that was 
required by the lower courts. Clear 
and convincing evidence is an 
evidentiary burden which is much 
more difficult for an employer to 
establish. Hopkins determined that 
such a difficult burden is not 
required in these types of cases.
The Hopkins case sets a 
precedent for employment 
discrimination cases with mixed 
motives. Sexual stereotyping is 
legally relevant to such cases. Once 
a woman develops a prima facie 
case that gender played a part in 
an employer’s decision, the burden 
of proof shifts to the employer to 
prove with a preponderance of 
evidence that the decision would 
have been the same if gender had 
not been considered. Hopefully, the 
case will heighten the awareness 
that sexual stereotyping is 
discriminatory. A positive outcome 
the profession should strive for is to 
eliminate sexual stereotyping in all 
personnel decisions — not just 
partnership decisions.
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